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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 The Notice of Appeal was sent to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)(2012 – Addendum 1). Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has issued an order retaining the case in 
the Utah Supreme Court effective July 6, 2016. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court erred in quashing the Writ of 
Execution issued February 16, 2011 and canceling the Utah County Sheriff’s 
Notice of Sale No. 11-0741.  
 
“The standard for setting aside a sheriff’s sale is based on case law. ‘[The Court] 
consider[s] the trial court’s interpretation of that law for correctness.’” Meguerditchian v. 
Smith, 2012 UT App 176, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 658 (quoting State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 
518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Preserved in the trial court at R. 0957-1044. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Jordan 
Construction’s declaratory relief claim and in granting FNMA’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Ruling that FNMA is not Bound by the Outcome 
of the Litigation Between Scott Bell and Jordan Construction. 
 
“Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the 
trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard.” Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989)(citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987)); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 
(Utah 1985). Preserved in the trial court at R. 1108-1155 and 1269-1283. 
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting FNMA’s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment ruling that Jordan Construction was not 
entitled to pre-judgment interest on its mechanic’s lien claim pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. 
 
“A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question 
of law which we review for correctness.” Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ¶ 16, 
82 P.3d 1064 (quoting Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)). Iron Head 
Const. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ¶ 7, 207 P.3d 1231, 1232 
 A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference given to the court’s legal conclusions. Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ¶ 10, 
288 P.3d 26, 30.  Preserved in the trial court at R. 2562-2566. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the trial court erred in granting FNMA’s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment ruling that the Second Amended Notice of 
Mechanic’s Lien was untimely. 
 
A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference given to the court’s legal conclusions. Davis, 2012 UT App at ¶ 10, 288 P.3d at 
30.  Preserved in the trial court at R. 3824-3903; 3236-3299; and 3477-3540. 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court erred in denying Jordan 
Construction’s Motion for Leave to Amend Admission. 
 
 “We review the denial of [a motion to withdraw admission] under a ‘conditional 
discretionary standard’, first determining if certain conditions have been met and then 
determining if the district court abused the discretion that it is allowed once the 
conditions have been met.” Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, ¶ 9, 178 P.3d 930, 932 
(quoting Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060–61 (Utah 1998)).   
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[O]ur review of the district court's action on a rule 36(b) 
motion is a two-step process: In the first step, we review the 
trial court's determinations as to whether amendment or 
withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits and 
whether amendment or withdrawal would result in prejudice 
to the nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the 
trial court's discretion to grant or deny the motion. Only after 
both rule 36(b) conditions have been met does a district court 
have discretion to grant or deny the motion to withdraw 
admissions, which decision we review for an abuse of 
discretion. But the court's preliminary determination as to 
whether the rule 36(b) conditions have been met is subject to 
a somewhat more exacting standard of review. 
 
Id. at ¶ 12 (internal quotes omitted). Preserved in the trial court at 3477-3540 and 3599-
3604. 
 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the trial court erred in determining FNMA to be 
the prevailing party and erred in awarding FNMA its attorney fees and costs. 
 
The question of which party is the prevailing party is a question for the trial court, 
and we therefore review the trial court's determination on this matter for abuse of 
discretion. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25, 40 P.3d 1119. However, the 
court's interpretation of binding case law on this matter is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See Houghton v. Department of Health, 2005 UT 63, ¶ 32, 125 P.3d 860. 
Preserved in the trial court at R. 4080-4107 and 4274-4284. 
ISSUE NO. 7: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to award Jordan 
Construction its attorney fees and costs. 
 
 “Which party is the prevailing party ... depends, to a large measure, on the context 
of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. We therefore review the trial court's determination ... under 
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an abuse of discretion standard.” R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25, 40 P.3d 
1119. Preserved in the trial court at 4313-4357 and 4443-4448. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court erred in quashing the Writ of 
Execution issued February 16, 2011 and canceling the Utah County Sheriff’s 
Notice of Sale No. 11-0741.  
 
Rule 64. Writs in General 
… 
(e) Claim to property by third person. 
 
(e)(1) Claimant's rights. Any person claiming an interest in 
the property has the same rights and obligations as the 
defendant with respect to the writ and with respect to 
providing and objecting to security. Any claimant named by 
the plaintiff and served with the writ and accompanying 
papers shall exercise those rights and obligations within the 
same time allowed the defendant. Any claimant not named by 
the plaintiff and not served with the writ and accompanying 
papers may exercise those rights and obligations at any time 
before the property is sold or delivered to the plaintiff. 
 
(e)(2) Join claimant as defendant. The court may order any 
named claimant joined as a defendant in interpleader. The 
plaintiff shall serve the order on the claimant. The claimant is 
thereafter a defendant to the action and shall answer within 14 
days, setting forth any claim or defense. The court may enter 
judgment for or against the claimant to the limit of the 
claimant's interest in the property. 
 
(e)(3) Plaintiff's security. If the plaintiff requests that an 
officer seize or sell property claimed by a person other than 
the defendant, the officer may request that the court require 
the plaintiff to file security. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 64(e). 
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Rule 64E. Writ of Execution 
 
… 
 
(d) Reply to writ; request for hearing. 
(d)(1) The defendant may reply to the writ and request a 
hearing. The reply shall be filed and served within 14 days 
after service of the writ and accompanying papers upon the 
defendant. 
 
(d)(2) The court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing 
as soon as possible and not to exceed 14 days. If the court 
determines that the writ was wrongfully obtained, or that 
property is exempt from seizure, the court shall enter an order 
directing the officer to release the property. If the court 
determines that the writ was properly issued and the property 
is not exempt, the court shall enter an order directing the 
officer to sell or deliver the property. If the date of sale has 
passed, notice of the rescheduled sale shall be given. No sale 
may be held until the court has decided upon the issues 
presented at the hearing. 
 
(d)(3) If a reply is not filed, the officer shall proceed to sell or 
deliver the property. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 64E(d). 
 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Jordan 
Construction’s declaratory relief claim and in granting FNMA’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Ruling that FNMA is not Bound by the Outcome 
of the Litigation Between Scott Bell and Jordan Construction. 
 
§ 78B-6-1303. Lis pendens—Notice 
 
(1)(a) Any party to an action filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah, or a Utah district court that 
affects the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
may file a notice of pendency of action. 
 
(b) A party that chooses to file a notice of pendency of 
action shall: 
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(i) first, file the notice with the court that has jurisdiction 
of the action; and 
 
(ii) second, record a copy of the notice filed with the court 
with the county recorder in the county where the property 
or any portion of the property is located. 
 
(c) A person may not file a notice of pendency of action 
unless a case has been filed and is pending in a United 
States or Utah district court. 
 
(2) The notice shall contain: 
 
(a) the caption of the case, with the names of the parties and 
the case number; 
 
(b) the object of the action or defense; and 
 
(c) the specific legal description of only the property 
affected. 
 
(3) From the time of filing the notice, a purchaser, an 
encumbrancer of the property, or any other party in interest 
that may be affected by the action is considered to have 
constructive notice of pendency of action. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303. 
 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting FNMA’s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment ruling that Jordan Construction was not 
entitled to pre-judgment interest on its mechanic’s lien claim pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Interest rates--Contracted rate--
Legal rate 
 
 (1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate 
of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
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(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate 
of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per 
annum. 
 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to 
affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations 
made before May 14, 1981. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. 
 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Second 
Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was untimely. 
 
§ 38-1-7. Notice of claim -- Contents -- Recording -- Service 
on owner of property 
 
  (1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person 
claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with 
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or 
some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold 
and claim a lien within: 
 
     (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final 
completion of the original contract if no notice of completion 
is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
 
     (B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of 
completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. 
 
   (ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), final completion 
of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, 
final completion of the project, means: 
 
     (A) if as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for 
the work, the date of issuance of a permanent certificate of 
occupancy by the local government entity having jurisdiction 
over the construction project; 
 
     (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by the 
local government entity having jurisdiction over the 
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construction project, but as a result of the work performed 
under the original contract an inspection is required as per 
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final 
inspection for the work by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; or 
 
     (C) if with regard to work performed under the original 
contract no certificate of occupancy and no final inspection 
are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local 
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction 
project, the date on which there remains no substantial work 
to be completed to finish the work on the original contract. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1) (2008). 
 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court erred in denying Jordan 
Construction’s Motion for Leave to Amend Admission. 
 
(c) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is 
conclusively established unless the court on motion permits 
withdrawal or amendment of the admission. The court may 
permit withdrawal or amendment if the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be promoted and withdrawal or 
amendment will not prejudice the requesting party. Any 
admission under this rule is for the purpose of the pending 
action only. It is not an admission for any other purpose, nor 
may it be used in any other action. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c). 
 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the trial court erred in determining FNMA to be 
the prevailing party and erred in awarding FNMA its attorney fees and costs 
and in refusing to determine that Jordan Construction was the prevailing 
party and refused to award Jordan Construction its attorney fees and costs. 
 
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees -- Offer of judgment 
 
  (1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in 
Subsection (2), in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
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(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in 
Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to recover attorneys' fees under 
Subsection (1). 
 
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce 
a lien under this chapter may make an offer of judgment 
pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by 
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree 
shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offeror 
after the offer was made. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (2008). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 This case originally arises from a dispute between Appellant Jordan Construction, 
Inc. and its former employee Scott Bell. Jordan Construction is a general contractor based 
in Provo, Utah. Scott Bell was first hired by Jordan Construction in 2005, and was 
assigned to manage a new division of Jordan Construction primarily dedicated to 
production and installation of granite countertops. In addition, Mr. Bell’s assigned duties 
included keeping the books and managing payroll for the entire company. 
 While he was employed by Jordan Construction, Mr. Bell decided to build a new 
home in Provo, using Jordan Construction as the general contractor. Because he was a 
trusted employee, Mr. Bell was allowed to arrange for the subcontractors, order materials, 
and generally manage the construction of his home himself. Jordan Construction prepared 
an estimate for construction on September 8, 2006, showing a cost to build of 
$445,558.13. Scott Bell obtained a construction loan for $417,000 and planned to pay the 
excess using personal funds and/or equity from the sale of his existing home.  
10 
 
 A building permit was issued, and construction began in November, 2006. 
Construction continued until October 16, 2008, though a certificate of occupancy was not 
issued until much later, on June 2, 2011. Unbeknownst to Jordan Construction, Mr. Bell 
made a number of upgrades and changes to the plans, and by the time it was finished, the 
total cost of the house was $767,025.17. Mr. Bell used the entire amount of the 
construction loan ($417,000), borrowed $50,000 from Charles Lewis
1
, and contributed 
$67,057.81 from the sale of his existing home. In total, there was a shortfall of 
$232,967.81. 
 Around the time that construction on the home was wrapping up, Wesley Lewis, 
the president of Jordan Construction became aware of the significant cost overruns and 
began to investigate. During his investigation, Mr. Lewis also discovered that over the 
course of more than three years, Scott Bell had embezzled at least $184,142.06 from 
Jordan Construction through misuse of company credit and debit cards, directing 
company funds for personal use, and through other means.  
 Upon discovering the embezzlement, Jordan Construction immediately fired Mr. 
Bell. Very shortly thereafter, Mr. Bell sued Jordan Construction for wrongful termination 
and breach of contract
2
. At that time, Jordan Construction did not know the full extent of 
the cost overruns on Scott Bell’s home, but knew for sure that there were cost overruns of 
at least $126,957.00 based upon information then readily available. On December 5, 
                                                          
1
 Charles Lewis is the father of Jordan Construction owner and President Wesley Lewis. 
This loan was never repaid. 
2
 Mr. Bell’s claims against Jordan Construction were resolved in the trial court and are 
not relevant to this appeal. 
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2008, Jordan Construction recorded a Notice of Mechanic’s Lien3 for $126,957.00, and 
on December 16, 2008 filed a counterclaim which included, among others, a lien 
foreclosure claim and a breach of contract claim related to the construction of Mr. Bell’s 
home. A Notice of Lis Pendens was recorded in the chain of title to the home the same 
day. 
As discovery proceeded, Jordan Construction continued to investigate the full 
extent of the embezzlement and the house cost overruns. Eventually, over the next 
several months, Jordan Construction determined that as best as it could determine, the 
actual amount of the cost overruns was $232,967.81. On July 27, 2009, Jordan 
Construction recorded a Second Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien for that amount. 
The litigation between Scott Bell and Jordan Construction proceeded to its 
conclusion in June, 2010, at which point Jordan Construction obtained a judgment against 
Mr. Bell on all of Jordan Construction’s counterclaims. Scott Bell filed for bankruptcy, 
and Jordan Construction obtained leave from the bankruptcy court to pursue a writ of 
execution and foreclose its mechanic’s lien. 
In the meantime, Scott Bell had stopped making his mortgage payments, and the 
holder of the Trust Deed on the home had commenced non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings of its own. Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) received an 
assignment of the Trust Deed immediately before the sale, and purchased the house at the 
trust deed foreclosure sale on October 1, 2010. 
                                                          
3
 The Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was amended shortly thereafter to correct a minor 
procedural error not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
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In January 2011, Jordan Construction applied for a writ of execution to foreclose 
its mechanic’s lien. A copy of the application was mailed to FNMA on January 19, 2011. 
Along with the Application for Writ of Execution, Jordan Construction enclosed three 
documents: (1) Checklist for Writ of Execution for Judgment Debtor and Persons with an 
Interest in the Property; (2) Notice of Execution and Exemptions; and (3) a Reply and 
Request for Hearing form. Neither FNMA nor anyone else objected or requested a 
hearing, and after the appropriate amount of time had passed, the trial court issued the 
writ on February 16, 2011. A sale date was scheduled with the Utah County Sheriff’s 
office shortly thereafter. 
Shortly before the foreclosure sale was to be held, FNMA moved to quash the 
Writ of Execution and the then-scheduled Sheriff’s sale on September 6, 2011. Jordan 
Construction opposed the motion, but the trial court nevertheless quashed the Writ of 
Execution and canceled the sale. Jordan Construction filed a Third-Party Complaint 
against FNMA, and this case in its current form commenced.  
Jordan Construction’s original Third-Party Complaint consisted of only one claim 
for declaratory relief declaring that FNMA was bound by the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered by the trial court against Scott Bell. FNMA moved to dismiss, 
and the trial court granted the motion, but allowed Jordan Construction to amend. Jordan 
Construction amended its Third-Party Complaint and included both a declaratory relief 
claim and a lien foreclosure claim. Again, FNMA moved to dismiss. The declaratory 
relief claim was dismissed, but the lien foreclosure claim was allowed to proceed. 
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As litigation proceeded, the trial court made several rulings from which Jordan 
Construction appeals, including: (1) that FNMA is not bound by the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered against Scott Bell; (2) that Jordan Construction is not entitled 
to prejudgment interest on its mechanic’s lien claim; (3) that Jordan Construction’s  
 Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was untimely and therefore not valid; (4) that Jordan 
Construction should not be permitted to amend a response to a request for admission 
when later-discovered facts clearly showed the admission was made in error; (5) that 
FNMA was the prevailing party and entitled to its attorney fees; and (6) that Jordan 
Construction was not entitled to its attorney fees. Final judgment was entered in this case 
on May 4, 2016.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
1. Appellant Jordan Construction, Inc. (“Jordan Construction”) is a licensed 
general contractor (R. 3207). 
2. Wesley Lewis (“Lewis”) is the founder, sole director, sole officer, and sole 
shareholder of Jordan Construction. (R. 3207) 
3. In 2005, Jordan Construction hired Scott Bell (“Bell”) as an employee. (R. 
3944) 
4. Mr. Bell was given the responsibility of managing the Artistic Marble & 
Granite division of Jordan Construction. His duties included management of payroll and 
finances for the entirety of Jordan Construction. (R. 3944) 
5. In 2006, Mr. Bell decided to build a new home, and hired Jordan 
Construction as the general contractor. (R. 3945) 
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6. Jordan Construction prepared a proposal for the construction of Bell’s 
home that totaled $445,558.13. (R. 3945) 
7. Bell accepted the proposal, and hired Jordan Construction to perform the 
general contracting work. (R. 0534) 
8. Mr. Lewis understood that Jordan Construction was going to be paid from 
the proceeds of a $417,000 construction loan that Mr. Bell had obtained, with the balance 
being paid from the proceeds of Mr. Bell’s then-existing home, and that Jordan 
Construction would in turn be responsible for paying the subcontractors (R. 3945) 
9. Mr. Bell was allowed to personally arrange for all of the subcontractors to 
work on his home and oversee much of the work, despite the fact that it was not generally 
within Mr. Bell’s job description to do so. (R. 3945) 
10. Excavation on the property began on October 13, 2006, and was completed 
on October 16, 2006. Thus, visible work began sometime between October 13, 2006, and 
October 16, 2006, but no later than October 16, 2006. (R. 3945) 
11. Bell moved into the home in October, 2007. (R. 3208) 
12. On or about February 5, 2008, Mr. Bell closed on his long-term financing, 
and executed a Deed of Trust in favor of his long-term financing lender. The Deed of 
Trust was recorded in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah (R. 3945). 
13. The final inspection for the home passed in October, 2008, after minor 
concrete flaws were repaired by Jordan Construction. (R. 3209). 
14. In October or November, 2008, Mr. Lewis discovered that Scott Bell had 
been embezzling money from Jordan Construction and fired Mr. Bell. (R. 3945) 
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15. In reviewing company records, Mr. Lewis also discovered that Mr. Bell had 
failed to pay Jordan Construction for the entire cost of Mr. Bell’s new home, though the 
full extent of Mr. Bell’s actions were still not entirely clear to Mr. Lewis (R. 3945). 
16. Mr. Bell commenced this case by filing a Complaint against Mr. Lewis and 
Jordan Construction alleging wrongful termination and other related claims on or about 
November 20, 2008. (R. 3945) 
17. As of that date, Jordan Construction was still not fully aware of the extent 
of Mr. Bell’s fraud and embezzlement scheme, but was actively investigating his 
activities. (R. 3945) 
18. On December 5, 2008, Jordan Construction caused a mechanic’s lien to be 
recorded against Bell’s home in the amount of $126,956.92, which represented the 
amount easily and readily ascertainable by Jordan Construction at the time. (R. 3946) 
Addendum 2 – Original Notice of Lien 
19. Once Mr. Lewis discovered that Mr. Bell had embezzled funds and failed to 
pay many of the subcontractors who worked on his new home, Mr. Lewis immediately 
began to investigate Mr. Bell’s records (to the extent they existed), Jordan Construction’s 
bank records, and other documentation to help determine the amount of damage Mr. Bell 
caused to Jordan Construction. (R. 3946) 
20. Mr. Lewis discovered that Jordan Construction’s bank accounts had 
diminished, but there was not a complete trail of monies paid into or out of those 
accounts relating to Mr. Bell. (R. 3946) 
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21. Mr. Lewis continued to investigate which subcontractors had worked on 
Mr. Bell’s home, whether they had been paid, and how they were paid. (R. 3946) 
22. Mr. Bell kept few receipts and records demonstrating how many of the 
subcontractors were paid, so it took several months to locate such records, review them, 
and eventually locate and communicate with those subcontractors to ensure they had been 
paid in full, by whatever means. (R. 3946) 
23. Once Mr. Lewis believed that he had, to the best of his ability, located all 
available records, contacted all known subcontractors, and determined whether they were 
paid in cash or by some other means, Mr. Lewis had to perform a detailed accounting 
reconciliation to determine the amount of monies Jordan had lost as a result of Mr. Bell’s 
activities. (R. 3946) 
24. Jordan Construction’s investigation ultimately revealed a total of 
$232,976.81 for costs associated with building Mr. Bell’s new home which remain 
unpaid. (R. 3947) 
25. On July 27, 2009, Jordan Construction amended its Notice of Mechanic’s 
Lien to reflect the amount determined from its lengthy and thorough investigation. (R. 
3947) (Addendum 3 – Second Amended Lien) 
26. Lewis would not have encountered such difficulties and it would not have 
taken as long as it did to determine the amount of damage Bell caused to Jordan 
Construction but for Bell’s embezzlement, fraudulent activities, and failure to keep 
accurate and complete records (R. 3213). 
17 
 
27. Jordan Construction timely recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on or about 
December 15, 2008. (R. 3211) (Addendum 4 – Lis Pendens) 
28. On June 24, 2010, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which 
awarded damages in the amount of $232,967.81 plus prejudgment interest to Jordan 
Construction on Jordan Construction’s breach of contract claim related to the 
construction of Mr. Bell’s home. (R. 0529-0539) 
29. Shortly after the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
Scott Bell filed for bankruptcy. Jordan Construction sought and obtained leave from the 
bankruptcy court to foreclose on its mechanic’s lien to recover the amounts of damages 
awarded to Jordan Construction related to the mechanic’s lien, but not on the other 
amounts awarded to Jordan Construction on Jordan Construction’s other claims.4 
30. On September 30, 2010, the Trust Deed was transferred to FNMA, who 
then purchased the property the following day at a non-judicial foreclosure sale on 
October 1, 2010. (R. 3214) (Addendum 5 - Trustee’s Deed) 
31. In January 2011, Jordan Construction applied for a writ of execution to 
foreclose its mechanic’s lien. A copy of the application was mailed to FNMA on January 
19, 2011. Along with the Application for Writ of Execution, Jordan Construction 
enclosed three documents: (1) Checklist for Writ of Execution for Judgment Debtor and 
Persons with an Interest in the Property; (2) Notice of Execution and Exemptions; and (3) 
                                                          
4
 There is no reference to this in the record, as it took place in the bankruptcy court in Mr. 
Bell’s bankruptcy case. This fact is provided for context and information purposes only. 
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a Reply and Request for Hearing form. (R. 0729-0744; R. 0999-1013) (Addendum 6 
Application for Writ) 
32. FNMA did not request a hearing or immediately object to the Writ of 
Execution, and the Writ of Execution was issued on February 16, 2011 (R. 0745-0746) 
33. A certificate of occupancy for the house was issued on June 2, 2011. (R. 
3538) (Addendum 7 – Certificate of Occupancy) 
34. On September 6, 2011, eight days before the mechanic’s lien foreclosure 
sale was scheduled to occur, FNMA filed its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and 
Utah County Sheriff’s Notice of Sale, No. 11-0741. (R. 0893-0895) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court should not have quashed the Writ of Execution and canceled 
the Sheriff’s sale because FNMA was afforded due process. Jordan Construction served 
FNMA with a copy of the writ of execution, along with a form for FNMA to complete 
and return within ten days if it objected to the writ. (R. 0729-0744; R. 0999-1013) 
(Addendum 6, Application for Writ). FNMA failed to timely object or request a hearing, 
and the writ was issued. Several months later, FNMA sought to quash the writ of 
execution and the sheriff’s sale by arguing that it was not afforded due process. FNMA 
was afforded due process by being given notice of the writ of execution and an 
opportunity to be heard.  
II. A lis pendens appeared in the chain of title to the property prior to the time 
that FNMA purchased the property at the trustee’s sale. FNMA was therefore on notice 
that it would take the property subject to the outcome of the pending litigation between 
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Jordan Construction and Scott Bell affecting title to the property. FNMA is not a bona 
fide purchaser in this case and should be bound by the judgment Jordan Construction 
obtained against Scott Bell. Further the doctrine of res judicata precludes FNMA from 
re-litigating issues previously litigated between Jordan Construction and Scott Bell. 
III. Jordan Construction is entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount stated 
on the face of its Mechanic’s Lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. A mechanic’s 
lien claim is one that necessarily arises from contract and the payment of past due money, 
and fits squarely within the holdings of relevant cases (cited herein) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1. 
IV. The trial court erred in holding that Jordan Construction’s second amended 
notice of mechanic’s lien was untimely and invalid. First, the limitations period 
applicable to mechanic’s liens in 2008 did not begin to run until a certificate of 
occupancy was issued for the property. A certificate of occupancy was not issued until 
June 2, 2011, nearly two years after Jordan Construction’s second amended notice of 
mechanic’s lien was recorded.   
Furthermore, due to Scott Bell’s fraudulent acts, Jordan Construction did not know 
the full amount for which it was entitled to a lien until July 2009. Thus, the discovery 
rule applies to toll the limitations period. Finally, the relation back doctrine should be 
applied to relate the second amended notice of lien back to the date of the original notice 
of lien, which was timely recorded. 
V. The trial court erred in refusing to allow Jordan Construction to withdraw 
or amend its response to a request for admission that was proven to be based upon faulty 
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information. The request for admission requested that Jordan Construction admit that 
Scott Bell had begun occupying the property in October 2007. In response, Jordan 
Construction admitted that Mr. Bell began occupying the property in October, 2007, but 
that a certificate of occupancy had not been issued until October, 2008. At the time of its 
response, Jordan Construction was under the impression that the property had passed its 
final inspection in October, 2008, and that the certificate of occupancy issued at the same 
time. It was later revealed that the certificate of occupancy was not issued until much 
later in 2011. The applicable limitations period for mechanic’s liens to be recorded in 
2008 began to run from the time the certificate of occupancy was issued. Thus, if the 
certificate of occupancy had been issued in October, 2008, the second amended notice of 
lien was arguably untimely. This is precisely what FNMA argued. However, if the 
certificate of occupancy had been issued in June, 2011, then the second amended notice 
of lien was timely. This is what Jordan Construction argued. Jordan Construction sought 
to withdraw or amend its prior admission to bring its response in line with the later-
discovered facts. The court refused to allow the withdrawal or amendment in error. 
VI. The trial court erroneously held that FNMA was the prevailing party and 
awarded FNMA its attorney fees and costs. Jordan Construction should have been 
considered to be the prevailing party and should have been awarded its fees and costs 
under the flexible and reasoned approach promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court. This 
is especially true in light of the fact that Jordan Construction should have been entitled to 
interest, and to have its second amended mechanic’s lien enforced. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE WRIT OF 
EXECUTION ISSUED FEBRUARY 16, 2011, AND CANCELING THE 
UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF’S NOTICE OF SALE NO. 11-0741.  
 
The trial court erred in quashing the Writ of Execution issued February 16, 2011, 
and in canceling the Utah County Sheriff’s Notice of Sale No. 11-0741 and should be 
reversed. “The standard for setting aside a sheriff’s sale is based on case law. ‘[The 
Court] consider[s] the trial court’s interpretation of that law for correctness.’” 
Meguerditchian v. Smith, 2012 UT App 176, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 658 (quoting State v. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
A. FNMA Waived its Right to Object to the Writ of Execution. 
After Jordan Construction obtained its judgment against Scott Bell which directed 
that Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien be foreclosed via sheriff’s sale (R. 0529) , 
Jordan Construction applied for a writ of execution that specifically directed the Utah 
County Sheriff to sell the property against which the mechanic’s lien had been filed. (R. 
0729).  
Writs of execution are governed by Rules 64 and 64E of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 64(e)(1) applies to all types of writs, including writs of execution, and 
explicitly imposes the same rights and obligations upon third parties who claim an 
interest in the property as a defendant to the underlying action.   
(e)(1) Claimant’s rights. Any person claiming an interest in 
the property has the same rights and obligations as the 
defendant with respect to the writ and with respect to 
providing and objecting to security. Any claimant named by 
the plaintiff and served with the writ and accompanying 
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papers shall exercise those rights and obligations within the 
same time allowed the defendant.  
 
U.R.C.P. 64(e)(1).  
 
Rule 64E of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically governs writs of 
execution. It clearly contemplates a situation such as this where there is a third party that 
claims an interest in the property to be executed upon, and provides for notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. FNMA failed to take advantage of its opportunity to be heard. 
Jordan Construction filed its Application for Writ of Execution on January 21, 
2011, (R. 0729), and in so doing complied with Rules 64 and 64E in every way. The 
Application itself (R. 0729) listed every person and entity that had ever claimed an 
interest in the Property, including FNMA. (R. 0732). A copy of the Application was 
mailed to FNMA on January 19, 2011, as is shown by the Certificate of Service attached 
thereto. (R. 0734). Along with the Application for Writ of Execution, Jordan 
Construction enclosed three documents: (1) Checklist for Writ of Execution for Judgment 
Debtor and Persons with an Interest in the Property; (2) Notice of Execution and 
Exemptions; and (3) a Reply and Request for Hearing form. (R. 0999-1013). All of these 
documents are forms produced by and approved by the Board of District Court Judges in 
2009, which with minor amendments, are still in use today. Because FNMA failed to 
return the Reply and Request for Hearing form, it waived its right to object. 
B. FNMA Was Afforded Due Process. 
The very purpose of the notice and service procedures governing writs of 
execution and the forms that are sent to an interested party is to afford due process to 
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those who may have an interest in the property to be executed upon. The checklist form 
clearly directs the recipient to carefully read the Notice of Execution and Exemptions 
form, and to reply and request a hearing. (R. 1007). The Notice of Execution and 
Exemptions form clearly states that “If you believe that . . . the Writ of Execution was 
issued improperly. . . then do the following immediately. You have a deadline of 10 
business days from the date that you were served with the writ and accompanying 
papers.” (R. 1008). It then directs the recipient to complete and return the attached Reply 
and Request for Hearing form. (R. 1008). 
Despite having been served with the Application for Writ of Execution, the 
Checklist for Writ of Execution for Judgment Debtor and Persons with an Interest in the 
Property, the Notice of Execution and Exemptions, and a Reply and Request for Hearing 
form, FNMA failed to comply with Rule 64E and request a hearing within 10 days. Rule 
64E(d)(3) provides that “if a reply is not filed, the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver 
the property.” There were no replies or requests for hearing filed within 10 days, and the 
trial court issued the Writ of Execution on February 16, 2011 (R. 0745). This is adequate 
due process. 
It was not until September 6, 2011, more than six months later, that FNMA filed 
its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Utah County Sheriff’s Notice of Sale, No 11-
0741(R. 0893). The trial court heard oral arguments on September 12, 2011, and entered 
its Order Quashing and Cancelling Writ of Execution and Utah County Sheriff’s Notice 
of Sale, No. 11-0741 (R. 0946). 
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It was error for the trial court to quash the Writ of Execution and cancel the 
Sheriff’s sale where FNMA did not follow proper procedural requirements in responding 
and requesting a hearing. The trial court’s order should be reversed. In this instance, the 
trial court does not have discretion, and is bound when the parties fail to follow 
procedural rules. FNMA had been served with notice of the writ of execution, and sat on 
its rights for more than six months, notwithstanding its obligation to file a reply and 
request for hearing within ten days of being served with the writ of execution documents. 
The trial court should be reversed, and Jordan Construction should be permitted to 
proceed with its mechanic’s lien foreclosure sale and recover the amount awarded in the 
judgment it obtained against Scott Bell. (R. 0888). 
II. FNMA IS BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY JORDAN 
CONSTRUCTION AGAINST SCOTT BELL. 
 
 This case was litigated in two principal parts. The first part of the case centered on 
a dispute between Scott Bell and Jordan Construction. Reduced to simplified terms, Scott 
Bell claimed that he was improperly terminated from his employment at Jordan 
Construction (R. 0001), and Jordan Construction claimed that Scott Bell had embezzled 
more than $180,000 and failed to pay Jordan Construction $232,967.81 of the cost of 
constructing Scott Bell’s personal home. (R. 0023) At the outset of the litigation, on 
December 15, 2008, Jordan Construction recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens in the chain of 
title of the home indicating that litigation affecting title to the property was currently 
pending in Fourth District Court. (R. 2741). 
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 At the conclusion of the first part of the case, Jordan Construction obtained a 
judgment against Scott Bell on August 3, 2011 (R. 0888). The judgment awarded 
damages for the embezzlement, but it also awarded $336,568.66 in damages on Jordan 
Construction’s mechanic’s lien claim related to Scott Bell’s failure to pay for 
construction of Scott Bell’s personal home. Id. It further provided that Jordan 
Construction could enforce its mechanic’s lien through a foreclosure sale of Scott Bell’s 
home. Id. However, in the interim, Scott Bell stopped making his mortgage payments, 
and the holder of the Trust Deed and note commenced a non-judicial foreclosure. (R. 
2660). FNMA ultimately purchased the home at the trustee’s sale on October 1, 2011. (R. 
2667). 
 Much of this case has centered on whether FNMA is bound by the judgment 
Jordan Construction obtained against Scott Bell. On March 7, 2014, FNMA moved for 
partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that FNMA was not bound by the judgment or 
findings obtained by Jordan Construction against Scott Bell (R. 2482). The trial court 
granted FNMA’s motion (R. 3226) in error and for the following reasons should be 
reversed. 
A. The Lis Pendens 
 It has never been disputed in this case that a lis pendens was recorded in the chain 
of title to the Scott Bell home on December 15, 2008 (R. 2741), and that this same lis 
pendens appeared in the chain of title to the home throughout this case, including at the 
time FNMA purchased the home at the trustee’s sale. Nevertheless, FNMA has 
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continually argued that it is not bound by the judgment Jordan Construction obtained 
against Scott Bell in spite of the lis pendens. See, e.g., R. 2575. 
 This Court has held that the purchaser of real property that is subject to a lis 
pendens acquires the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. “The recording of 
a lis pendens provides constructive notice to all persons that the rights and interests in the 
property at issue are controverted. One who purchases property subject to a lis pendens 
acquires only the grantor’s interest therein, as determined by the outcome of the 
litigation.” Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 2006) (citing Hidden Meadows 
Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). As explained by the Court in Timm, the 
only exception is a bona fide purchaser who took without notice of the pending litigation. 
The very purpose of a lis pendens is to prevent a subsequent purchaser from taking 
without notice. If a lis pendens appears in the chain of title, a purchaser cannot be a bona 
fide purchaser without notice. “The recording of the notice of lis pendens is deemed to 
give notice, not only of the fact the action relating to the property it describes is pending, 
but what that action entails and the disposition thereof.” Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 
(Utah, 1975). 
 Further, “[t]he recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons that 
any rights or interests they may acquire . . . are subject to the judgment or decree. One 
who acquires an interest in land that is the subject of the pending litigation . . . is 
charged with notice of the claimed contrary rights of others, and he is bound by the 
judgment rendered in the litigation.” Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 
(Utah 1978). 
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 Because a lis pendens appeared in the chain of title to the property at the time 
FNMA purchased it, FNMA is charged with notice of the pending litigation, and is bound 
by the judgment rendered in the litigation. Id. Any other result is contrary to the very 
purpose of a lis pendens. The trial court failed to properly recognize that FNMA is bound 
by the judgment against Scott Bell, at least as it applies to the property in question. (R. 
3206). This Court should reverse the trial court and declare that FNMA is in fact bound 
by the judgment Jordan Construction obtained against Scott Bell and direct the lower 
court to enforce the judgment against FNMA. 
B. Res judicata prevents re-litigation 
 FNMA should not have been permitted to re-litigate the lien amount and the issue 
of priority, as those issues had already been decided in the litigation between Scott Bell 
and Jordan Construction. (R. 0529; 0888). “The doctrine of res judicata embraces two 
distinct branches: claims preclusion and issue preclusion.” Mack v. Utah State Dept. of 
Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194 (citation omitted). “Issue preclusion, which 
is also known as collateral estoppels, prevents parties or their privies from relitigating 
facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit” Oman v. Davis 
School Dist, 194 P.3d 956, 965 (Utah 2008). Issue preclusion applies only when the 
following four elements are met: 
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must 
have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; 
(iii) the issue in the first action must have been completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 1267 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 “[C]laim preclusion corresponds to causes of action[;] issue preclusion 
corresponds to the facts and issues underlying the causes of action.” Mack, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 
29. (citation omitted) (alterations in original). “Claim preclusion is premised on the 
principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only once.” Id. (citations omitted). “To 
promote this principle, claim preclusion bars a party from bringing in a subsequent 
lawsuit a related claim that has already been fully litigated.” Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, 
¶ 6, 259 P.3d 1049 (citation omitted). 
 In order to preclude a claim from being re-litigated, the party attempting to 
preclude the claim must demonstrate that the claim involves the same parties or privities, 
that the claim was presented in the first action or could and should have been brought in 
the first action, and that the first action resulted in a final judgment on the merits:  
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and 
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.  
 
Mack, 2009 UT 47 at ¶ 29 (citations omitted). “By barring claims that satisfy this three-
part test, claim preclusion advances three important purposes.” Allen, 2011 UT 44 at ¶ 7. 
Those three important purposes are finality of the claim, judicial economy, and 
preservation of the integrity of the judicial system:  
First, it ensures finality and “protect[s] litigants from 
harassment by vexatious litigation.” Second, it promot[es] 
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judicial economy by preventing previously litigated [claims] 
from being relitigated. Finally, claim preclusion “preserv[es] 
the integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent 
judicial outcomes.”  
 
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  
 This Court has explained that “ensuring that parties will have to litigate a 
controversy only once” will “promote finality and protect litigants.” Id. at ¶ 10. Judicial 
economy is promoted when parties “assert all of their related claims in one proceeding.” 
Id. at ¶ 11 (citation omitted). “Resolving a dispute in one action protects judicial 
resources from being burdened by the need to address identical claims in multiple 
forums.” Id. (citation omitted). “In this respect, the judicial interest in avoiding the 
burden of repetitious litigation is allied with a party’s interest in finality and preventing 
vexatious lawsuits.” Id. at n.17. “In addition, resolving a dispute in one action ensures 
that judicial resources are expended on binding determinations.” Id. at ¶ 11. Finally, the 
application of claim preclusion “will preserve the integrity of the judicial system by 
preventing inconsistent judgments[,] . . . [which] may occur when multiple courts 
examine the same evidence to make the same factual determinations.” Id. at ¶ 12. The 
danger is that the two courts (or even the same court) might reach opposite conclusions 
with respect to the claims presented. See id. If that were to occur, the public confidence in 
the judicial system would be undermined. See id.   
1. Scott Bell and FNMA are in Privity With Each Other, and FNMA is 
the Successor in Interest to Scott Bell. 
 
 The first requirement for both issue preclusion and claim preclusion is that both 
cases involve the same parties or their privities. See Mack, 2009 UT 47 at ¶ 29 (citations 
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omitted). This Court “has defined the word ‘privity’ as a ‘mutual or successive 
relationship to the same right or property.” Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 
1943). “As applied to judgments or decrees of courts, the word means one whose interest 
has been legally represented at the time.” Id. (citation omitted).  
 Several courts have explained that “‘[p]rivity’ as used when applying the doctrine 
of res judicata in the circumstances in issue here means mutual or successive relationship 
to precisely the same right of property; as testator and executor, ancestor and heir, 
assignor and assignee, grantor and grantee, and lessor and lessee.” Sawyer Nurseries v. 
Galardi, 181 Cal. App. 3d 663, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing United States v. Stull, 
105 F.Supp. 568, 571 (D.C. Conn. 1952); Estate of Hanson, 126 Cal. App. 2d 71, 271 
P.2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 19 
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P. 892 (Cal. 1942)) (emphases added). “Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary . . . defines ‘privity’ as follows: ‘4 b: mutual or successive 
relationship to the same rights of property: the relationship between privities whereby 
they succeed to the same legal right or duty derived from a common source.’” Id. at n.6.  
 Here, Mr. Bell had the same interest in the Property that FNMA has now. That is, 
Mr. Bell originally held title to the Property in fee simple and through a series of 
transactions, FNMA acquired the Property in fee simple. FNMA’s interest is identical to 
that which Mr. Bell once held. FNMA holds a “successive relationship to precisely the 
same right of property . . . as grantor and grantee . . . .” See Galardi, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 
672 (citations omitted). Therefore, the first requirement for res judicata is satisfied in this 
case.  
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2. All Claims Regarding the Mechanic’s Lien were Presented or Could 
and Should Have Been Raised During the Litigation Between Scott 
Bell and Jordan Construction, Were Fully and Fairly Litigated, and 
Resulted in a Final Judgment on the Merits.   
 
All claims relating to the mechanic’s lien were raised or could and should have 
been raised during the litigation between Scott Bell and Jordan Construction. This Court 
has made clear that “[c]laims or causes of action are the same as those brought or that 
could have been brought in the first action if they arise from the same operative facts, or 
in other words from the same transaction.” Mack, 2009 UT 47 at ¶ 30 (citation omitted) 
(emphases added). It went on to explain that “[r]ather than resting on the specific legal 
theory invoked, res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the 
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Id. (citations omitted). “A 
claim or cause of action is ‘the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right 
enforceable in the courts.’” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, “if a party raises claims 
based on the same operative facts or the same transaction, it may be precluded if the 
other elements of claim preclusion are met.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 Here, issues related to the validity and amount of Jordan Construction’s 
mechanic’s lien were set forth and conclusively determined by the trial court in the first 
part of the case against Scott Bell. (R. 0529). The trial Court specifically ruled that 
“Jordan Construction is the prevailing party in the above-captioned matter, including on 
its mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim” and found that Jordan Construction was entitled to 
attorneys’ fees, interest, costs, and a Writ of Execution and Decree of Foreclosure to sell 
the Property. (R. 0888). Therefore, the validity, amount, and all other issues related to the 
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mechanic’s lien were presented in the first action between Mr. Bell and Jordan 
Construction. Any challenges to the validity, amount, or other matters related to the 
mechanic’s lien could and should have been raised at that time as they arise from the 
same operative facts and transactions at issue. Therefore, res judicata should be applied 
to preclude those issues and prevent re-litigation of those claims.  
3. The First Portion of This Case Resulted in a Final Judgment on the 
Merits.  
 
Utah courts have made clear that summary judgment, for res judicata purposes, 
satisfies the final judgment on the merits requirement. See e.g. Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Int’l & Dev. Corp., 1999 UT App. 232, ¶ 16, 986 P.2d 765 (“Summary judgment on the 
Separation Agreement claims constituted a judgment on the merits which became final 
upon entry of the Final Order.”);  
 Res judicata prevents re-litigation of the issues and claims even if, in hindsight, 
the trial court comes to some conclusions that differed from those reached in the first part 
of the case. See Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2000 UT App. 371, ¶ 26, 16 
P.3d 1251 (citations omitted) (citing Gail v. Western Convenience Stores, 434 N.W.2d 
862, 863 (Iowa 1989) (stating “the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed 
judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong 
or rested on legal principles later overruled in another case”); Cleveland v. Ohio Dep’t of 
Mental Health, 84 Ohio App. 3d 769, 618 N.E.2d 244, 247-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that failure to appeal judgment bars collateral attack even if judgment is based 
on erroneous view of law)); see also Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Properties, 480 
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F.2d 536, 538 (10
th
 Cir. 1973) (“It is equally well settled that where the issue of due 
process has been litigated and final judgment entered, the determination of that issue, 
right or wrong, is res judicata.”)).  
 This Court has made clear that a final order, “unless reversed on appeal, is res 
judicata and binding.” Collins, 2000 UT App 371 at ¶ 27 (citing Piacitelli v. Southern 
Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted)) (emphasis 
added). If the complaining party does not appeal the order, it is binding on all parties. See 
id. at ¶ 28 (citation omitted).  
 In this case, the trial court decided all issues relating to the property between 
Jordan Construction and Scott Bell in Jordan Construction’s favor in all respects, 
including on its mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim. (R. 0529). The trial court 
subsequently entered a final modified Order regarding those issues on August 3, 2011, 
conclusively determining all issues contained therein. (R. 0888). Mr. Bell, FNMA’s 
predecessor in interest, did not appeal that Order or otherwise take any action with 
respect thereto. Therefore, res judicata should have been applied to prevent re-litigation 
of the issues. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed, and the judgment Jordan 
Construction obtained against Scott Bell should be enforced as entered.   
III. JORDAN CONSTRUCTION IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AT THE STATUTORY RATE. 
 
 On March 7, 2014, FNMA filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing 
that Jordan Construction should not be entitled to pre-judgment interest on its mechanics’ 
lien claim because the mechanic’s lien statute in effect when the mechanics’ lien was 
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recorded did not expressly provide for pre-judgment interest. (R. 2559). The trial court 
granted FNMA’s motion in error (R. 3206), and should be reversed. 
 The trial court’s ruling that Jordan Construction is not entitled to pre-judgment 
interest simply ignores the statutory pre-judgment interest rate set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-1. It provides for a default statutory prejudgment interest rate of 10% per 
annum for claims arising from the forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action. 
Id. 
 The Court’s ruling also ignored the fact that Utah courts have awarded pre-
judgment interest at the statutory rate on mechanic’s lien cases in the past. See, e.g., 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). “[T]he interest issue is injected by law into 
every action for the payment of past due money.” Id. at 809. In addition, prejudgment 
interest is appropriate “when the loss has been fixed as of a definite time and the amount 
of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-
established rules of damages.” Iron Head Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ¶ 11, 207 
P.3d 1231 (internal citation omitted). In Iron Head, the Gurneys hired Iron Head 
Construction to expand and remodel part of their home. The parties signed a contract that 
indicated Iron Head would be paid $168,558 for the work. Once construction began, the 
Gurneys made several changes to the scope of the project. Id. at ¶ 2. At the completion of 
the project, Iron Head attempted to collect an additional $82,463.33 above and beyond 
the contract price. The Gurneys refused to pay, and litigation ensued. Id. at ¶ 3. During 
trial, the parties settled for $43,500, with the parties reserving the issue of prejudgment 
interest. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court awarded interest, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
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because (1) the $43,500 was not damages, as it was a settlement absent an admission of 
liability for damages; (2) the settlement amount could not be calculated to a mathematical 
certainty. Id.  
 The Iron Head case is distinguishable from this case. In this case, the lien amount 
claimed by Jordan Construction to be subject to interest was not a settlement amount. It 
was the full amount on the face of the lien. Second, the lien amount was calculated to a 
mathematical certainty – again, the amount listed on the face of the lien. 
 A mechanic’s lien claim is one that necessarily arises from contract and the 
payment of past due money, and fits squarely within the holding of Lignell and Utah 
Code Ann. 15-1-1. Prejudgment interest at the statutory rate should have been awarded 
by the trial court. 
 In 2012, the Utah Legislature codified the ruling in Lignell, and specifically 
applied the Section 15-1-1 interest rate to all mechanic’s lien claims. Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1a-309. Therefore, Jordan Construction is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest at 
the rate of 10% per annum from the time the money was first due until judgment is 
awarded. The trial court’s ruling should be reversed and this Court should remand for a 
determination of the amount of interest to which Jordan Construction is entitled. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JORDAN 
CONSTRUCTION’S SECOND AMENDED MECHANIC’S LIEN WAS 
UNTIMELY. 
 
The trial court erred in holding that Jordan Construction’s Second Amended 
Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was untimely and therefore invalid. It is clear that the original 
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notice of lien and its subsequent amendments were timely recorded under the provisions 
of the 2008 version of Utah’s mechanic’s lien statutes.  
A. The Certificate of Occupancy Controls the Limitations Period. 
At the time of the recording of Jordan Construction’s mechanic’s lien and the 
filing of this action, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(I)
5
 provided as follows: 
[A] person claiming benefits [of a mechanic’s lien] shall 
file for record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a 
written notice to hold and claim a lien no later than: 
 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final 
completion of the original contract if no notice of completion 
is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
 
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion 
is filed under Section 38-1-33 but not later than the time 
frame established in Subsection (1)(a)(i)(A). 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(I) (2008). It was undisputed that Jordan Construction 
completed its work on or about October 16, 2008. (R. 3209). However, under the terms of 
the statute as it read in 2008, that date is irrelevant and immaterial. 
 The term “final completion of the original contract” is defined in the Notice of 
Claim Statute, and given a particular meaning: 
For purposes of this Subsection (1), final completion of the 
original contract . . . means: 
 
                                                          
5
 The trial court analyzed this statute in its Ruling on FNMA’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dealing with the timeliness of Jordan Construction’s Second 
Amended Mechanic’s Lien (R. 3206). The trial court denied FNMA’s motion at that 
time, but later granted a renewed motion on the same issue (R. 3839). 
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(A) If as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required 
for the work, the date of issuance of a permanent 
certificate of occupancy by the local government entity 
having jurisdiction over the construction project; 
 
(B) If no certificate of occupancy is required by the local 
government entity having jurisdiction over the 
construction project, but as a result of the work performed 
under the original contract an inspection is required as per 
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of final 
inspection for the work by the local government entity 
having jurisdiction over the construction project; 
 
(C) If with regard to the work performed under the original 
contract no certificate of occupancy and no final 
inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes 
by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the 
construction project, the date on which there remains no 
substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the 
original contract; or 
 
(D) If as a result of termination of the original contract 
prior to the completion of the work defined by the original 
contract, the compliance agency does not issue a 
certificate of occupancy or final inspection, the late date 
on which substantial work was performed under the 
original contract. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(ii) (2008).  
  Provo City issued its Certificate of Occupancy on June 2, 2011. (R. 3538). 
Therefore, under the clear terms of the statute, the last date on which Jordan 
Construction’s mechanic’s lien could have been filed was 180 days following June 2, 
2011, well after Jordan Construction filed its Second Amended Mechanic’s Lien.  
 FNMA (and the trial court) relied upon a mistaken admission made by Jordan 
Construction that stated that a certificate of occupancy had been issued in 2008 
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(discussed at length at Section V herein). The Certificate of Occupancy is attached hereto 
at Addendum 7. There is no evidence more credible than the actual certificate of 
occupancy itself. It would be a miscarriage of justice and common sense to conclude that 
even though we have the actual certificate of occupancy, we are going to assume that the 
certificate was issued three years earlier because one of the parties erroneously so 
admitted. At the time that admission was made, Jordan Construction did not have 
definitive knowledge on the issue. However, at that time, that was Jordan Construction’s 
understanding, and Jordan Construction assumed the certificate had been issued. It turns 
out that the certificate of occupancy was not actually issued until 2011. The trial court 
ignored the best evidence, namely the actual certificate of occupancy, and ruled that a 
certificate of occupancy was issued in 2008 based upon an admission that Jordan 
Construction was not really qualified to make. The trial court’s ruling in this respect 
should be reversed, and the Court should look to the actual certificate of occupancy to 
determine when the relevant limitations period began to run. 
B. The Limitations Period Should Have Been Tolled. 
 
1. Equitable Tolling (the Discovery Rule) Generally.  
 
Even if the Second Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was brought outside the 
applicable limitations period, it should be revived by the Equitable Discovery Rule. The 
Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged two situations in which a statute of limitations 
may be tolled “until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.” Hill 
v. Allred, 2001 UT 16 ¶15, 28 P.3d 1271. In Warren v. Provo City, 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
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1992), the Supreme Court specifically recognized the following situations in which a 
statute of limitations should be tolled:  
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by 
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant’s 
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations 
where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented 
the discovery of the cause of action.  
 
Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129. The first enumerated exception is known as the internal 
discovery rule or statutory discovery rule, and is not applicable in this case. Russell 
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 21, 24, 108 P.3d 741. See also, In re 
Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129; Hampton v. Professional Title Services, 
2010 UT App 294, ¶20, 242 P.3d 796 (Roth, J., concurring).  
Although there are three enumerated exceptions discussed in the Warren case, 
Utah courts have clarified that the latter two are actually two separate prongs of the 
“equitable discovery rule” which, if applied, tolls the statute of limitations. 
We have limited the circumstances in which an equitable 
discovery rule may operate to toll an otherwise fixed statute 
of limitations period to the following two situations: (1) 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of 
action because of the defendant’s concealment or misleading 
conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the 
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.  
 
Russell Packard Dev., Inc., 2005 UT 14 at ¶25 (internal quotations omitted).  
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2. Equitable Discovery Rule Applies in This Case.  
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized that absent a statutory tolling provision, 
a limitations period could nevertheless be equitably tolled on estoppel grounds in Rice v. 
Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). In Rice, the plaintiff sued for injuries 
sustained when she, while attending a high school football game, fell from bleachers 
allegedly negligently maintained by the defendant school district. The trial court 
dismissed the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had brought her cause of action 
outside the then-applicable one-year limitations period. Id. at 160.  
The plaintiff argued that the court should toll the limitations period because an 
insurance adjuster for the defendant school district had contacted the plaintiff and told her 
that the insurance company would compensate her for her injuries as soon as the damages 
could be ascertained. Based upon the insurance adjuster’s assurances, the plaintiff 
delayed in filing suit until after the limitations period had run. Id.  
The Utah Supreme Court tolled the limitations period on an estoppel theory, 
reasoning that “[o]ne cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of 
security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead 
that very delay as a defense to the action when brought.” Id. at 163. It held that “[a]cts or 
conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim 
will be made may create an estoppel against pleading the Statute of Limitations.” Id. See 
also, Hampton v. Professional Title Services, 2010 UT App 294, 242 P.3d 796 (Roth, J. 
concurring) (equitable tolling has its genesis in estoppel). 
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In Russell Packard Development, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
equitable discovery rule at length. It clarified the circumstances in which a plaintiff could 
invoke the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule to toll the statute of 
limitations.  
[A] plaintiff may successfully toll a statute of limitations by 
showing that, given the defendant’s concealment of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action, the plaintiff neither discovered nor 
reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying the 
cause of action before the limitations period expired. Once a 
plaintiff makes this showing, the concealment version of the 
discovery rule will operate to toll the relevant statute of 
limitations, and the limitations period will not commence 
until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or constructive 
knowledge of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause 
of action.  
 
Id. at ¶ 29. Thus, a statute of limitation will be equitably tolled under the so-called 
discovery rule where the defendant concealed the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim 
until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of all of the facts necessary to his 
or her cause of action.  
In this case, the facts underlying Jordan Construction lien claim were concealed by 
Scott Bell. (R. 3946-47; R. 3213). Jordan Construction acted reasonably in attempting to 
discover the extent of Scott Bell’s fraud and concealment. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that “the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s conduct [is evaluated] in light of the 
defendant’s fraudulent or misleading conduct.” Id. at ¶ 26. See also, In re Hoopiiaina 
Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 36, 144 P.3d 1129 (in-depth discussion of concealment prong of 
equitable discovery rule).  
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In this case, it was only after an extensive and exhaustive investigation was Jordan 
Construction aware of the full extent of Scott Bell’s fraud. (R. 3946-47; R. 3213). This is 
the very definition of concealment, fitting squarely within the definitions set forth by 
Utah courts. Thus, the concealment prong of the discovery rule operates to equitably toll 
the relevant limitations period. The trial court should be reversed on this point. 
C. The Relation Back Doctrine Should be Applied. 
Even if the trial court was correct in refusing to consider the actual certificate of 
occupancy and rely only on Jordan Construction’s admission, and the equitable discovery 
rule did not apply, the trial court should have applied the relation back doctrine to allow 
the amended lien to be enforced. Although an amended notice of lien is not exactly the 
same as an amended pleading in litigation, the rationale in favor of applying the doctrine 
is essentially the same and should be applied in this case.  
“Utah’s relation back doctrine developed out of the common law under which a 
party could correct a clerical error without bringing a new action where the real parties 
were involved unofficially all along.” Gary Porter Const. v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT 
App 354, ¶ 32, 1010 P.3d 371. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also 
addresses relation back of amendments. “Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading.” Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
In this case, FNMA had actual notice of the amended notice of mechanic’s lien 
because the amended notice of mechanic’s lien appeared in the chain of title long before 
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FNMA ever acquired the trust deed or the property itself. (R. 3947) (Addendum 3 – 
Second Amended Lien). FNMA cannot reasonably argue that it did not have notice of 
Jordan Construction’s claim. There is no compelling reason that the amendment should 
not be permitted in this case given the circumstances of this case. Additionally, the 
second amended notice of mechanic’s lien arose from the same transaction and set of 
facts as the original notice of lien. In arguing that the second amended notice of lien was 
untimely, FNMA simply took advantage of Scott Bell’s fraud and concealment. 
The same rationale should be used in this case. The Second Amended Mechanic’s 
Lien clearly related back to the original mechanic’s lien on its face. Given the 
circumstances of this case, it would be equitable to apply the relation back doctrine and 
enforce the Second Amended Mechanic’s Lien. The trial court’s ruling should be 
reversed. 
V. JORDAN CONSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO 
WITHDRAW ITS ADMISSION WHEN IT WAS CLEARLY 
CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE. 
 
 Rule 36(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “The Court may 
permit withdrawal or amendment if the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
promoted and withdrawal or amendment will not prejudice the requesting party.” This is 
in effect a two part inquiry. First, the Court should determine whether amendment or 
withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits. Second, the Court should 
determine whether allowing an amendment or withdrawal would prejudice the party 
propounding the request for admission. See Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App. 44 at ¶12 
(citing Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-611 (Utah 1998). 
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 In this case, the issue of whether a certificate of occupancy was issued is 
important. FNMA argued (and the trial court ruled) that Jordan Construction’s Second 
Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was untimely recorded on July 27, 2009, because it 
was recorded more than 180 days after the last day Jordan Construction provided the last 
of its services on the home. (R. 3389; R. 3703) In response, Jordan Construction argued 
that it was timely because pursuant to the 2008 version of Utah’s Mechanic’s Lien 
Statute, the time for recording a mechanic’s lien does not begin to run until after a 
certificate of occupancy is issued. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(I) (2008)
6
. Thus, it 
follows that if a certificate of occupancy was not issued until June 2, 2011, Jordan 
Construction’s 2009 mechanic’s lien would be timely.  
 The trial court ignored the certificate of occupancy because of Jordan 
Construction’s response to a request for admission propounded by FNMA. (R. 3708). 
The request for admission read, “Admit that Scott Bell began occupying the Property in 
October, 2007.” (See R. 3505). Jordan Construction responded as follows: “Admit that 
Scott Bell occupied the property pursuant to a temporary occupancy permit beginning in 
October 2007. However, construction on his home was not yet finished, no final 
inspection had been completed and no permanent occupancy permit had been issued until 
October 2008.” (R. 3505). 
 The trial court erred, and Jordan Construction should have been permitted to 
amend its response to Request for Admission No. 2 as it would serve the presentation of 
                                                          
6
 The statute cited herein has since changed. It is important to look to the 2008 version of 
the statute, which applies in this case. 
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the merits of this case because the later-discovered certificate of occupancy proves that 
Jordan Construction’s statement that Scott Bell occupied the property pursuant to a 
temporary occupancy permit is actually false. Furthermore, Jordan Construction’s 
statement that a temporary certificate of occupancy had been issued was not actually 
responsive to the request, which simply requested an admission that Scott Bell began 
occupying the property in October 2007. Allowing an amendment to an unqualified 
admission would have more accurately and fully responded to the request and more fully 
complied with Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, amending the 
response to an unqualified admission would not prejudice FNMA. 
A. Presentation of the Merits Would be Served by Allowing an 
Amendment Because Newly Discovered Evidence Proves that Jordan 
Construction’s Statement Regarding a Certificate of Occupancy is 
Factually Incorrect. 
 
 After a careful review of documents produced by Provo City in response to a 
subpoena issued by FNMA, and interviews with Provo City personnel, it became clear 
that no certificate of occupancy of the property of any kind was issued until June 2, 2011. 
(R. 3538).  
 At the time of Jordan Construction’s responses to FNMA’s requests for 
admissions, Jordan Construction believed that a certificate of occupancy had been issued, 
but later learned that this was not the case. Because under the 2008 mechanic’s lien 
statute, the issue of whether Provo City had issued a certificate of occupancy is 
determinative of whether Jordan Construction’s Second Amended Mechanic’s Lien was 
46 
 
timely filed, allowing Jordan Construction to amend its response to an unqualified 
admission would serve the presentation of the merits of this case.  
B. Jordan Construction’s Response That a Certificate of Occupancy Had 
Been Issued in 2008 Was Not Directly Responsive to the Request and 
Should Have Been Ignored 
 
 FNMA’s Request for Admission No. 2 reads “Admit that Scott Bell began 
occupying the Property in October 2007.” (R. 3505). Jordan Construction’s response goes 
beyond what was actually being requested. “Admit that Scott Bell occupied the property 
pursuant to a temporary occupancy permit beginning in October 2007. However, 
construction on his home was not yet finished, no final inspection had been completed 
and no permanent occupancy permit had been issued until October 2008.” (R. 3505). 
Jordan Construction’s response should have simply been an unqualified admission, as the 
remainder of the response is not really relevant to the matter requested, and was based on 
an incorrect assumption. It is clear that Jordan Construction is admitting that Scott Bell 
occupied the property in October 2007, which is all that is requested, and is all that 
should have been said in the response. The qualifying language does not really qualify 
the admission at all.  
 Though Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a responding party to 
admit part of the request and deny part of the request, it does not provide for additional 
explanation or qualified admissions. Thus, the extraneous portion of the response was not 
provided for by the rules, and should have been a simple, unqualified admission. Jordan 
Construction should be permitted to amend its response to make it an unqualified 
admission without further explanation, as that is what the FNMA’s request sought. 
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C. An Amendment to An Unqualified Admission Would Not Have 
Prejudiced FNMA. 
 
 FNMA argued in response to Jordan Construction’s Motion for Leave to Amend Its 
Admission that because Provo City recorded a Certificate of Notice of Compliance dated 
October 21, 2008 (R. 3806), there is conclusive proof that a certificate of occupancy had 
been issued, and that Jordan Construction’s prior admission that a certificate of 
occupancy had been issued is on all fours with the evidence. (R. 3538). That is simply not 
true. In fact, the Certificate of Notice of Compliance highlights exactly why Jordan 
Construction was mistaken in the first place. (R. 3806). The Certificate of Notice of 
Compliance is not a Certificate of Occupancy. Simply because it contains the statement 
that “A certificate of occupancy has been issued” does not make it so. In fact, closer look 
at Provo City’s file reveals that there is no record of any Certificate of Occupancy ever 
having been issued prior to June 2, 2011. The simplest explanation is that the Certificate 
of Notice of Compliance was mistaken and that no Certificate of Occupancy had in fact 
been issued. Otherwise, why would a separate permanent Certificate of Occupancy have 
been issued in 2011? Jordan Construction was then mistaken in believing that a 
Certificate of Occupancy had been issued in 2008, when in fact it had not been issued. 
 In any event, it is a stretch to argue that the Certificate of Notice of Compliance is 
dispositive of the issue of the timeliness of the Second Amended Lien, because it is not 
clear from the Certificate of Notice of Compliance that the Certificate of Occupancy to 
which it refers was a permanent Certificate of Occupancy. At best, it would have been a 
temporary Certificate of Occupancy, as the permanent Certificate of Occupancy was in 
48 
 
fact issued in 2011. The 2008 version of the mechanic’s lien statute makes it clear that 
work is not completed until a permanent Certificate of Occupancy is issued. A temporary 
Certificate of Occupancy does not trigger the statute. 
For purposes of this Subsection (1), final completion of the 
original contract . . . means: 
 
(E) If as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required 
for the work, the date of issuance of a permanent 
certificate of occupancy by the local government entity 
having jurisdiction over the construction project; 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(ii) (2008) (emphasis added). Clearly, the best evidence 
we have is the actual permanent Certificate of Occupancy issued in June of 2011, rather 
than a vague statement contained within a Certificate of Notice of Compliance that is 
unsupported by the evidence. 
 The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Jordan Construction to 
amend its prior admission in light of the newly discovered evidence that proved that the 
admission was inaccurate, and the trial court should be reversed. 
VI. JORDAN CONSTRUCTION IS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS. 
 
The trial court erred in refusing to award attorney fees to Jordan Construction and 
awarding attorney fees instead to FNMA. “Attorney fees are awardable only if provided 
for by statute or contract. . .” Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 
(Utah App. 1989). In this case, attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to statute. 
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Under Utah Code § 31-1-18(1) (2008), the prevailing party in this case is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees and costs.  
Sometimes, however, the identity of the prevailing party is not immediately 
obvious. “[d]etermining the prevailing party is often an imprecise process. Utah courts 
have developed a ‘flexible and reasoned approach’ for determining which party has 
emerged the “comparative winner.” Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, ¶ 7 (quoting 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 557-58). A flexible and reasoned approach applied in this 
case reveals Jordan Construction as the “comparative winner.” Id. 
In this case, the parties stipulated to judgment in favor of Jordan Construction and 
an award of damages in the amount of $126,956.92. This is 54% of the $232,976.81 
listed on the face of the Second Amended Lien. Jordan Construction did not bring 
separate claims for foreclosure of the Original Lien and the Second Amended Lien. It 
was only one claim. Furthermore, the Original Lien and the Second Amended Lien were 
not separate liens. They were a single lien for the same work on the same property. The 
Amended Lien was never intended to be a separate mechanic’s lien. Instead, it was 
merely aimed at more correctly listing the amount owed by Scott Bell to Jordan 
Construction after Jordan Construction had enough time to fully investigate. There is one 
lien and one lien foreclosure claim.  
Jordan Construction is the prevailing party in this case because it prevailed on its 
mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim. FNMA stipulated to entry of judgment in favor of 
Jordan Construction on that claim, the very claim for which Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-18(1) 
(2008) awards fees to the prevailing party. Because Jordan Construction was awarded 
50 
 
judgment on that claim, it was the prevailing party as to that claim. Furthermore, even if 
FNMA was successful as to a portion of the damages sought, Jordan Construction was 
the overall prevailing party as it recovered the full amount of the Original Lien, and more 
than half of the principal amount of the Second Amended Lien. The trial court therefore 
should have awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs to Jordan Construction. 
In addition, because Jordan Construction should have been permitted to pursue the 
full amount of its Second Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, and should have been 
entitled to interest, it becomes even more clear that Jordan Construction was the 
prevailing party and should have been awarded its attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
Utah Code § 31-1-18(1) (2008). Thus, the trial court erred and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed. 
 DATED this 7th day of September, 2016. 
      _________________________________ 
      Jeffery J. Owens 
      Attorney for Jordan Construction, Inc. 
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